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NOTES AND COMMENTS .

it would not appear that this would cause them to become "nugatory"
under the third subsection. Therefore, it is felt that when the court
examines the law on this subject in greater detail it would hold that
actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation do survive.
HENRY W.

CONNELLY

Tenancy in Common-Equitable Partition-One Cotenant's Attempt
to Devise or Convey a Specific Portion of Common Property
A point decided in the recent North Carolina case of Taylor v.
Taylor1 raised the question of the effect of one cotenant's purporting to
devise or convey an absolute interest in a specific quantity of the land
held in common. The decisions in this area are not numerous, and the
ones found seem to apply a particular rule to each differing fact situation.
Nevertheless, the cases would appear to be divisible into three logical
categories, and it is believed that certain fairly consistent principles lie
behind the results of the cases involving this question.
PurportedConveyance or Devise of the Whole of the Common Property
One of the most commonly encountered situations is that in which
one cotenant, who owns only an undivided interest in the land, attempts
to transfer by deed or will the entire interest in the whole tract held in
common. As to the effect of this, all the cases seem to be in accord.
The rule here is that the transferor conveys or devises his entire interest
in the property, which is his undivided interest in the whole tract de2
scribed.
Purported Conveyance or Devise by Metes and Bounds of a Specific
Portionof the Common Property
Where one cotenant purports to transfer by metes and bounds a
specific portion of common property, there are two defects in the transaction. First, the tenant attempts to transfer the entire fee in the land
described rather than his undivided interest in it. Second, the attempted
transfer of a specific portion of the undivided tract is in effect a unilateral
attempt to partition. Thus the courts do not ipso facto give effect to
such an attempted transfer. However, most of the states which have
passed on the question find such a transfer to be merely voidable at the
election of the grantor's cotenants; and only they can avoid it if, and to
the extent that, it prejudices them.3 This has been called the equitable
'- 243
N. C. 726, 92 S. E. 2d 136 (1956).
Devises:
Spitzer v. Branning, 139 Fla.
259, 190 So. 516 (1939) ; Van Reuth v.
Mayor and City Council, 165 Md. 651, 170 At. 199 (1934) ; Lushington v. Sewell,
1 Russ. & M. 174, 39 Eng. Rep. 65 (1830). Deeds: Home Owners' Loan Corp.
v. Cilley, 125 S. W. 2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Bailey v. Howell, 209 N. C.
712, 716, 184 S. E. 476, 478 (1936) (dictum) (grantee of cotenant takes only
cotenant's share and steps into his shoes).
'Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele, 235 Fed. 465 (4th Cir. 1916); Lane v.
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partition doctrine. If the nonconveying cotenants can get their proper
share of the common property from the portion not conveyed, their interests are not prejudiced and the deed by metes and bounds is operative.5
In a suit for partition brought by a nonconveying cotenant,0 the New
Hampshire court said:
".. - Her [the grantor's] deed of the whole of a distinct
parcel of the common property is good to the extent of her
interest. Her deed is also valid against the plaintiff in partition,
unless the land conveyed or some portion of it is equitably required to give him his just share in the whole. Except in such
contingency, her deed is a partition of the premises." 7
The equitable partition rule has on occasion been stated to apply
only when the portion of the land conveyed "does not exceed either in
extent or value the aliquot share of the tenant in the whole property."
Yet in a case in which the value of the part conveyed exceeded the
grantor's share, the court did give a species of equitable partition. In
Pickens v. Glassock,0 one cotenant had conveyed by metes and bounds,
apparently without consideration, 10 one acre of a large tract of common
Malcolm, 141 Ga. 424, 81 S. E. 125 (1914); Potter v. Wallace, 185 Ky. 528, 215

S. W. 838 (1919) ; Cressey v. Cressey, 215 Mass. 65, 102 N. E. 314 (1913) ; Lasater
v. Ramirez, 212 S. W. 935 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919). See Stark v. Barrett, 15 Cal.
361 (1860) where one cotenant conveyed his interest in a specific portion of the
common property. The grantee was allowed to eject a trespasser because the
conveyance was good as against everyone but the nonconveying cotenant, and the
conveyance was said to be subject to the determination of the nonconveying cotenant's rights.
'Although this doctrine is widely recognized, the actual term "equitable
partition" seems mainly confined to the Texas opinions cited. However, the phrase
will be used throughout this note because it represents a convenient label for this
idea.
3
Zawaba v. Allen, 228 S. W. 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ; Gosch v. Vrona, 227
S. W. 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
' California has held that the grantees would be necessary parties defendant in
any partition proceedings by virtue of the real party in interest statute. Gates v.
Salmon, 35 Cal. 576 (1868). The same result would seem to be required under
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-70 (1950), requiring that parties be joined as plaintiffs or defendants who are united in interest.
It seems that the transferees would not have to wait for the cotenants to bring
an action for partition, but could sue for partition themselves. This is because
they have a right to possession of the property transferred to them. Mahoney v.
Middleton, 41 Cal. 41 (1871). Also, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1950) seems to
authorize the transferee of a specific portion of common property to bring the action,
as he is definitely one of the real parties in interest.
Warner v. Eaton, 78 N. H. 515, 516, 102 Atl. 535, 536 (1917).
'86 C. J. S., Tenancy in Common § 122 (b) at 536 (1954).
'78 S. W. 2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
"0The opinions lay no stress on the special equities of the innocent purchaser for
value in giving the grantee the right to get on partition the specific parcel conveyed
to him when this is not prejudicial to the nonconveying cotenants. See Zinn v.
Farmer, 243 S. W. 523, 525 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (dictum) (deed "at least
susceptible of the construction that it was operative as a gift," held sufficient to
convey the specific portion described). Although no direct holdings have been
found, it is thus believed that the basic operation of the equitable partition doctrine
would apply to devises as well as to cases involving deeds. In fact, the North
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property to a church. The church leased the mineral rights to the plaintiff who sued in trespass to try title. The equitable partition doctrine
was held to be inapplicable to set off to the grantee church the entire
acre conveyed because oil had been found on that acre and there was no
evidence that the other cotenants could get their equal share out of the
remainder of the common property. However, the court did not declare
the deed void but said "although such deed purported to convey the whole
of the title, it in fact was effective to convey only the one-half undivided
interest of the grantor."'"
The court ordered a partition to give the
12
grantee one half of the acre.
Of course a conveyance or devise by only one cotenant of a specific
portion of the common property may be a valid partition where the
8
other cotenants acquiesce in or ratify the transaction.'
Purported Conveyance or Devise of All the Common Property by
TransferringSeparate Parcels to Two or More Different Transferees
Only a few cases have been discovered where a cotenant has purported
to devise or convey by separate parcels to different transferees all of
the common property. In such a transfer, it is obvious that each could
not take the full specific portion transferred to him because the nonconveying cotenants would have nothing whatever from which to get
Carolina court cited a deed case in the principal case of Taylor v. Taylor. Also
in Frederick v. Frederick, 219 Ill. 568, 581, 76 N. E. 856, 861 (1906), the court was
considering a devise of a specific portion of common property by metes and bounds
by one cotenant and it said: "If one cotenant attempts to convey the whole or any
part of any specific portion of the common estate, such conveyance is void at least
in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the other cotenants. The grantee
under such a conveyance may occupy the position of the grantor, but under no circumstances can his rights be any greater." The court declared the devise void
because it would prejudice the rights of the cotenants.
The sentiment quoted above, to the effect that the grantee may never have any
greater rights than his cotenant-grantor, is often seen in the opinions. Yet it is
curious to note that the grantee may have a slight preference in that the usual
cotenant never has on partition any sort of equitable claim to a specific portion
of the common property.
"1 Pickens v. Glassock, 78 S. W. 2d 257, 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). But see
Soutter v. Porter, 27 Me. 405 (1847) where the court refused to allow a conveyance
by metes and bounds to vest in the grantee the grantor's undivided interest, saying
that the court will not permit such a construction of a deed as would convey an
estate of a different kind or description from that intended to be conveyed. No
cases are found following this theory in other jurisdictions. FREaMAN, COTENANCY
§ 206 (1882) denounces this case, saying that if a deed may not operate in the
manner intended by the parties, the courts will endeavor to construe it in such
a way that it shall operate in some other manner.
1 This case involves unusual facts and may be distinguishable.
The remedy
of partition of the one acre only is uncommon. Generally partition is a proceeding
where the rights of all of the parties in all of the land in the tract are adjusted.
Caraway v. Hebert, 182 So. 164 (1938) ; 68 C. J. S. Partition§ 55 (b) (2) (1950).

113 S. W. 2d 1229 (Tex. Comm. App. 1938); Railroad
v. Christian,
Co13Joyner
mm'n v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 125 . W. 2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939);
Berryman v. McDonald, 107 S. W. 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908). Acquiescence or
ratification is generally found where the nonconveying cotenant either takes the
remaining part and lives on it and improves it or merely abides by the sale voluntarily for a period of years.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

their portions. Other than the principal case, the only such decision the
writer has found is the New Mexico case of Madrid v. Borrego.14 A
cotenant with a one-half undivided interest purported to convey half of
the tract to grantee A. Later, he purported to convey the other half of
the land to grantee B. The nonconveying cotenant's heirs brought an
ejectment action against both A and B. The'trial court refused to grant
the ejectment and the plaintiffs appealed. The supreme court reversed
and remanded in order to allow more evidence to be taken as to whether
a partition by acquiescence had taken place after the first deed had been
made. If there had been a partition by acquiescence after the delivery
of the first deed, the second deed would be void because the property
described would belong to the nonconveying cotenant. 1
However, the court did discuss the legal situation which would arise
if there were not acquiescence by the plaintiff. Although dictum, it
would appear to be in the nature of instruction for the trial court if it so
found the facts. The court said 6 that each grantee would own a one-half
undivided interest in the specific portion attempted to be conveyed to
him. The nonconveying plaintiff would in this case continue to own his
undivided interest in the whole, now split up into two tracts held as
tenancies in common. The court did not speak of possible prejudice to
the plaintiff in having his former undivided interest in a large tract
divided into undivided interests in two smaller tracts. It is possible that
in the particular case all of the land was of the same value uniformly
throughout the tract, and that location of any portion on partition would
not affect the value of the land to the tenant. The solution offered by
this court seems to be an extension, a doubling of the remedy applied in
Pickens v.Glassock. Yet it is clear that a rigid split of a large tract of
common property into two smaller tracts of common property would
often be prejudicial to the rights of the nonconveying cotenant. What
the court would do in such a case does not appear.
The principal North Carolina case, Taylor v. Taylor, concerned the
construction of a will in which the testator devised half of the common
property to son A; the other half of the common property was devised to
son B. Son C was devised another tract, but this devise was void for
reasons not material here. The court held that the attempted devises
to sons A and B were void for uncertainty. 17 The court quoted as
authority a legal encyclopedia to the effect that "where there are two
"54
N. M. 276, 221 P. 2d 1058 (1950).
15 See note 13 supra.
18 Madrid v. Borrego, 54 N. M. 276, 278, 221 P. 2d 1058,
1060 (1950) (dictum).
"'The court was asked to construe the will, and counsel for both sides failed
to argue this specific question in their briefs. The lower court had held these
same devises to A and B to be invalid because the intention of the testator could
not be carried out since he thought he was the owner of all of this common property.
The North Carolina Supreme Court did not mention this and did not include it in
its reasons for declaring the devises void.
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tenants in common, each owning an undivided half of land, neither can
make a partition that will be binding on the other by assuming to convey
either half specifically."'" It seems that this rule is not clearly applicable
to the facts of this case but would apply to the previous category covered
where there was a conveyance by metes and bounds of a specific portion
less than the whole. Neither does the rule seem to consider the equitable
partition doctrine, although the legal encyclopedia quoted states in
another section that most courts do recognize it.19
The result of this case did not seem to defeat the overall intention
of the testator since it threw the testator's interest in this realty into
intestacy and resulted in an equal division of realty between sons A, B,
and C. A holding otherwise as to the attempted devise of the property
owned in common would have caused C to be left out entirely. However,
the situation can easily be imagined in which voiding such a mistaken
devise and letting the undivided interest pass either by the residuary
clause or by intestacy would wreck the entire testamentary scheme.
A perfect example would be furnished by this very case had the devise
of the individual tract to C been valid; he would then have taken the
tract devised to him plus whatever share in the common property might
come to him by the residuary clause 0 or by intestacy.
It is submitted that the holding of the North Carolina court in the
Taylor case should be restricted to its facts in subsequent cases insofar
as it may indicate that North Carolina would not follow the equitable
partition doctrine. It is doubtful whether the court even considered the
doctrine, since it did not mention it. Justice was done in this particular
case but the rule of law applied there could create a grave injustice in
subsequent cases. Certainly the equitable partition doctrine should be
invoked at least as to conveyances to purchasers for value. And, there
does not seem to be any real reason why it could not apply as well to
devises when to follow the doctrine would more nearly carry out the
21
intention of the testator.
PHILLIP C. RANSDELL
1868 C. J. S., Partition § 9 (c) (1950). The only case cited to support this
statement was ]Eaton v. Talmadge, 24 Wis. 217 (1869). The proposition, unsupported by citation of authority, did appear in that case, but it seems to be dictum
since the court actually upheld the partition. One cotenant had conveyed a
specific portion by metes and bounds, and the other cotenant subsequently conveyed
the remainder of the property also by metes and bounds. The court held both
conveyances to be valid since the latter conveyance was an acquiescence in the
partition effected by the original conveyance.
1886 C. J. S., Tenancy in Common § 122 (b) (1954).
30

See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42.2 (Supp. 1955).

Assuming a case of a deed or devise of halves of a tract to each of two
transferees as in the Madrid and Taylor cases, it is clear that the intent of the
testator or grantor might most nearly be approximated with fairness to the nonconveying cotenant by giving each transferee a one-fourth undivided interest in
the whole. The problem of the split of the common property discussed in connection with the Madrid case would be avoided. But this solution would not be
2'1

